高盛：中美房地产低迷比较

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3.0 胡杨林 2024-04-24 101 553.75KB 14 页免费

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There are plenty of differences between the current Chinese housing downturn n

and the US subprime crisis in 2007-09, including the developmental stage of the

two countries, the trigger of the downcycles, and the transmission mechanisms

after the bust. However, there are still lessons China can draw from the US

experience. In this note, we discuss some of the deeper differences between

the two housing markets, analyze where we are in the current Chinese housing

downcycle, and outline lessons from the US subprime crisis pertaining to China.

At the peak of the market, house prices were excessively high in both the US n

(2006) and China (2021), but the causes were very different. In the US case,

overly loose lending standards fueled housing demand, whereas in China’s case

the problem lies in local governments’ monopoly and reliance on land sales. A

simple calculation shows that the average price to income ratio peaked at 3.5 in

the US in 2006 and was much higher at 7.8 in China in 2021. Although the

government has been trying to rein in high house prices since 2016, a

fundamental change may require local ﬁscal reforms.

Historically, EM economies tend not to experience large nominal house price n

declines due to growing population, rising urbanization, rapid wealth

accumulation, and elevated inﬂation. In contrast, in DM economies, where

population growth is slow, urbanization is ﬁnished, and inﬂation is low, nominal

prices adjust signiﬁcantly to achieve the same real price adjustments. Because

nominal price declines are more damaging to household balance sheets, credit

performance, and bank losses, sustained low inﬂation is likely to make China’s

housing deleveraging considerably more painful than the typical EM housing

bust.

Regardless of the underlying causes, once a housing bust begins, it tends to last n

for a long time. We estimate that real house prices in China declined 16% from

the peak in 2021Q3 to 2023Q3. If the US experience is of any guidance, we are

only halfway through the downward price adjustment in the current housing

downturn. Declines in housing starts and new home sales are more advanced

than house prices, but both are likely to stay depressed over the next few years

given the large inventory overhang.

The transmission from the US housing downturn to the broader economy n

differed from China’s in the speciﬁcs but was similar in spirit in three

Hui Shan

+852-2978-6634 | hui.shan@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Roger Ashworth

+1(212)902-2106 |

roger.ashworth@gs.com

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC

Kenneth Ho

+852-2978-7468 | kenneth.ho@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Maggie Wei

+852-2978-6962 | maggie.wei@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Lisheng Wang

+852-3966-4004 |

lisheng.wang@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Xinquan Chen

+852-2978-2418 | xinquan.chen@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Yuting Yang

+852-2978-7283 | yuting.y.yang@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Andrew Tilton

+852-2978-1802 | andrew.tilton@gs.com

Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.

Asia Economics Analyst

Comparing China and US Housing Downturns: Different

Fiscal Backdrop, Same Need to Prevent Spillovers

12 February 2024 | 6:15PM HKT

Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC

certiﬁcation and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to

www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.

6437aaa8de6c4611b8ac8998231c2d63

dimensions. First, deleveraging weighs signiﬁcantly on growth, even though it was

household deleveraging in the US and property developer and local government

deleveraging in China. Second, banks behave extremely conservatively after housing

busts, even though this affected lending to households in the US and lending to

developers, LGFVs, and businesses with property collateral in China. Third, it is

important for policymakers to prevent spillovers from the housing bust to the real

economy, even though the spillovers were related to foreclosures and ﬁnancial

market contagion in the US and more related to local government spending cuts in

China.

12 February 2024 2

Goldman Sachs Asia Economics Analyst

6437aaa8de6c4611b8ac8998231c2d63

Comparing China and US Housing Downturns: Different Fiscal Backdrop,

Same Need to Prevent Spillovers

The US and China housing markets are different in many respects. While the US had

long been a mature economy before the run-up to the subprime crisis, China is still a

developing country in the process of urbanization: over 80% of home sales in the US

are existing home sales whereas most home sales in China are new home sales. As our

credit strategists have highlighted previously, housing-related debt is concentrated

among households in the US vs. among real estate developers and local governments in

China. During the US subprime crisis, the moment house prices stopped rising, the

credit-fueled bubble burst.1 In China, the “Three Red Lines” imposed by the

government to rein in property developer leverage in 2020 triggered the downturn.

Despite these differences, there are key lessons from the US experience applicable to

China. In this note, we ﬁrst explain one major difference between the Chinese and the

US housing markets that has not received much attention, then discuss where we are in

the current Chinese housing downcycle, and ﬁnally draw essential lessons from the US

subprime crisis pertaining to China.

Structural reasons are behind the extremely high house prices in China. All real estate is

local and, in China, local governments have a monopoly over land supply and land sales

are an important source of local government revenues. Gross land sales account for a

large share of local governments’ total revenue (e.g., almost 30% in 2021).3 Local

Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) often use land as collateral to borrow from

banks and function as a shadow funding channel for local governments. Among the

different types of land, residential land sales contribute the most to total land sales

revenue, indirectly subsidizing industrial land supply as local governments sell industrial

land at a fraction of the price of residential land in China (Exhibit 2

Structural reasons behind China’s high house prices

House prices peaked in 2006 in the US. By our estimates, prices were 40% above the

fair value determined by fundamentals such as population, income, and vacancy rate.

But this “expensiveness” pales when compared with the Chinese urban housing

market. 更多一手调研纪要和研报数据加V：shuinu9870Based on simple calculations

using each country’s per capita income, averagehousehold size, and the average price of

new homes, we show that the price-to-income ratio was 7.8 in China in 2021 when the

Chinese housing market peaked, compared with 3.5 in the US in 2006 (Exhibit 1).2

).4

1See “US housing market crash turns not-so-sweet 16”, The Credit Line, 10 October 2023 for more details.

2Because of the rapid urban property development in China in the 2000s and 2010s, new home construction

gradually moved from city centers to outskirt areas and from top-tier cities to lower-tier cities, resulting in

slower increases in average new property prices than what a repeat-sales index would suggest.

Underreporting of income in household surveys is probably a bigger problem in EM economies like China than

in DM economies like the US.

3Here local governments’ total revenue includes central government transfers. The net revenue from land

sales would be much smaller than gross revenue, as 75% of the gross revenue is used for compensating

farmers and preparing the land for sales. That said, such spending should have positive spillovers to the local

economy and indirectly contribute to local government revenues.

12 February 2024 3

Goldman Sachs Asia Economics Analyst

6437aaa8de6c4611b8ac8998231c2d63

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标签： #房地产

摘要：

ThereareplentyofdifferencesbetweenthecurrentChinesehousingdownturnnandtheUSsubprimecrisisin2007-09,includingthedevelopmentalstageofthetwocountries,thetriggerofthedowncycles,andthetransmissionmechanismsafterthebust.However,therearestilllessonsChinacandrawfromtheUSexperience.Inthisnote,wediscusssomeof...

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