欧洲央行-央行数字货币与货币政策实施（英）-2024.4-53页

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Occasional Paper Series

Central bank digital currency and

monetary policy implementation

Enea Caccia, Jens Tapking,

Thomas Vlassopoulos

No 345

Disclaimer:

This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The

views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.

Contents

Abstract 2

Non-technical summary 3

1 Introduction 6

2 Impact of a CBDC on the demand for bank deposits 8

Box 1 The impact of a zero remuneration of CBDC on the demand for

bank deposits 12

3 The balance sheet mechanics of a CBDC 15

3.1 The impact of a CBDC-induced deposit outflow on reserves 15

3.2 The maximum amount of CBDC-induced deposit outflows

tolerable from a monetary policy implementation perspective 21

Box 2 High-level design choices of current CBDC initiatives across

the globe 24

4 CBDC and the smooth implementation of monetary policy 28

4.1 Floor system 28

Box 3 Model showing the impact of a CBDC on the amount of

reserves needed for smooth implementation of monetary policy:

floor system 32

4.2 Corridor system 35

Box 4 Model showing the impact of CBDC on the amount of reserves

needed for smooth implementation of monetary policy: corridor

system 38

5 Conclusions 42

Proofs of results 1 to 4 44

References 48

ECB Occasional Paper Series No 345

Abstract

This paper discusses the impact that a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC)

could have on the implementation of monetary policy. Monetary policy

implementation could be affected if the introduction of the retail CBDC changes the

volume of commercial bank deposits held by customers, which would, in turn, affect

central bank reserves. While it is often assumed that customer deposits would

decrease if a CBDC was introduced, we provide arguments why this is by no means

clear cut and deposits could even increase. If bank deposits do decrease, banks

would need to draw on, and therefore reduce, their central bank reserve holdings.

Moreover, uncertainty as to the timing and extent of any conversions of deposits into

CBDC might prompt banks to scale up their demand for central bank reserves in

order to hold larger precautionary buffers. Consequently, central banks might need

to adjust their reserve supply and other features of their monetary policy

implementation, depending, for example, on whether they use a floor or a corridor

system for monetary policy implementation. In the specific case of the digital euro,

the features already envisaged for its design would make it possible to minimise the

risk of negative consequences for monetary policy implementation.

JEL codes: E41, E42, E43, E52, E58, G21

Keywords: Monetary policy implementation, central bank digital currency, central

bank reserves.

ECB Occasional Paper Series No 345

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摘要：

OccasionalPaperSeriesCentralbankdigitalcurrencyandmonetarypolicyimplementationEneaCaccia,JensTapking,ThomasVlassopoulosNo345Disclaimer:ThispapershouldnotbereportedasrepresentingtheviewsoftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB).TheviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheECB.Contents...

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