布鲁盖尔研究所-央行数字货币的增值：来自欧元区的观点（英）-2023.6-19页

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Maria Demertzis (maria.

demertzis@bruegel.org) is a

Senior Fellow at Bruegel

Catarina Martins (catarina

martins@bruegel.org) is a

Research Analyst at Bruegel

Executive summary

Different jurisdictions have set out dierent reasons for creating central bank digital

currencies (CBDCs). Some countries, particularly those with already-operational CBDCs for

retail purposes, aim to to promote nancial inclusion. But in countries where most citizens

have access to nancial services, central banks are interested in CBDCs as an aspect of the

increasing digitalisation of nance.

Central banks could also choose to use CBDCs to guarantee in full citizen’s holdings

(currently, deposits in commercial bank are only partially guaranteed), but this would

trigger major changes in the nancial system in terms of the role of commercial banks in

intermediation and the role of at money. So far, central banks have not opted to go this way.

In the euro area, consumers have multiple payment options and a very ecient retail

payments system. e currency enjoys high levels of trust and is not challenged by the

emergence of private currencies, such as Bitcoin, or by the risk that cash, a monetary system’s

anchor, will disappear. erefore, creating a CBDC for retail purposes in the euro area oers

little obvious value added, at least for the foreseeable future.

However, there is a strong case for building a CBDC that banks could use for cross-border

wholesale purposes (ie with other currencies). Wholesale CBDCs could revolutionise the way

that cross-border, cross-currency payments are made for two reasons.

1. Cross-border payments are currently slow and inecient. Pilot projects have shown that

wholesale payments with CBDCs can generate substantial time and cost savings.

2. Any two central banks that have operational wholesale CBDCs could settle

transactions between themselves. is would be very dierent from the current

system, as most settlements today are done via the dollar (and then the euro)

infrastructure and use correspondent banks.

The euro area and the United States would have to consider carefully from a geopolitical

perspective how wholesale CBDCs might aect their global economic standing. By

developing a CBDC for wholesale purposes, the European Union would be able to contribute

to developing the global standard.

Recommended citation

Demertzis, M. and C. Martins (2023) ‘e value added of central bank digital currencies: a

view from the euro area’, Policy Brief 13/2023, Bruegel

Policy Brief

Issue n˚13/23 | June 2023 The value added of central

bank digital currencies: a view

from the euro area

Maria Demertzis and Catarina Martins

2Policy Brief | Issue n˚13/23 | June 2023

1 Introduction

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), a digital equivalent of cash, are increasingly gaining

traction. At least 114 jurisdictions, representing 95 percent of global GDP, are at some stage of

developing a CBDC1. In 11 countries, CBDCs are now a reality and operate in parallel to their

physical equivalent. But it is not necessarily easy for the consumer to understand the dier-

ence between a euro in coin or note form and a digital euro.

A good starting point in identify the benets of CBDCs is to understand the problem

that cannot be solved through the increasing range of digital payment options provided by

the private sector, and which therefore requires the state’s intervention. is is important in

explaining why the taxpayer might be asked to nance the creation of a CBDC.

We argue that CBDCs do have added value, but this is not the same for every country. In

countries with high levels of nancial exclusion and where there is a lack of modern and reli-

able digital payment systems, a CBDC can facilitate access to payments for many people. But

in countries with ample payment solutions and where nancial exclusion is a second-order

problem, the justication is dierent. Central banks worry that as nance becomes increas-

ingly digitalised, two things might happen: rst physical cash, the anchor of any nancial

system, will be displaced, and second, private currencies will become popular. Both could

reduce the monopoly of sovereign money. Central banks fear this would compromise their

ability to maintain monetary and nancial stability.

CBDCs will have a dual purpose, just like their physical equivalent: for retail purposes,

typically by consumers and small businesses to make daily payments, representing a small

part of total payments; and for wholesale (ie bulk) purposes by banks and other nancial

institutions, either domestically or cross border. In the euro area, most eorts to date have

focused on how to develop a retail CBDC. Only recently2 has there been also an attempt to

advance thinking on the wholesale aspects as well.

On the retail side, the arguments for a digital euro put forward by the European Central

Bank revolve around the speed of digitalisation of nance and the notion of strategic auton-

omy. e prospect of nance becoming predominantly and eventually even exclusively digital

threatens the existence of sovereign money and compromises the role of its guardian, the

central bank. e ECB also argues that a big part of all payments is managed by foreign play-

ers, who collect sensitive information about EU citizens. A pan-European payment method

that is very close to cash would help reduce this vulnerability. It would also help homogenise

payments in the euro area and, given easier access, may help promote the international role

of the euro.

However, these reasons, understandable as they might be, do not make a compelling case

for a retail digital euro, at least for now. ere is no imminent threat that digitalisation will

undermine the role of the physical euro. And there are easier ways, like through regulation,

to promote the creation of a uniformly-accepted digital instant payment method in the EU,

without having the taxpayer nance a CBDC. Meanwhile, Europe’s vulnerability arising from

foreign players being present in the payment sphere is a very delicate argument. Does the EU

want to create European payment players at the expense of competition?

Finally, the euro has acquired a very stable international role, second to, and quite far

from, the dollar. At best, a digital equivalent can only expand the euro’s international appeal

at the margins. Other factors that pertain to a more integrated and well-governed European

economy would advance more signicantly its international acceptability. ere are also

several technical choices, including limits on the amount of digital euros that any citizen can

1 See the Atlantic Council central bank digital currency tracker: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/cbdctracker/.

2 See European Central Bank press release of 28 April 2003, ‘Eurosystem to explore new technologies for wholesale

central bank money settlement’, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2023/html/ecb.pr230428~6a59f44e41.

en.html.

Central bank digital

currencies do have

added value, but this

is not the same for

every country

3Policy Brief | Issue n˚13/23 | June 2023

hold, or the fact that these deposits will not be remunerated, that also prevent the greater

international use of the euro. In addition, the Eurosystem has a very fast and ecient retail

payment system and can still nd eciency gains within the current system. All these make

the case for a digital euro even less attractive.

However, the EU and the global nancial system can really benet from developing whole-

sale CBDCs for making payments outside the euro area. is can generate eciency gains

for all payments made outside the EU. In our view, the creation of CBDCs globally has the

potential of revolutionising cross-border payments. For now, one reason why the dollar is the

currency of choice globally is because it oers the infrastructure via which any two parties can

settle a transaction. Any two countries that have CBDCs will have in principle the ability to

settle transactions between them, bypassing the current dollar-based system.

Before this could happen however, there would have to be a commonly agreed global

standard on how to design and use CBDCs. is is a signicant barrier as it requires mutual

recognition of legal systems and agreement on economic and technical design issues (BIS,

2022). Global governance will be a major obstacle to this revolution and the euro area and the

United States would have to consider carefully how their economic standing globally would

be aected.

For example, current sanctions on Russia mean that countries that want to continue

economic relations with Russia cannot do so in dollars or euros. Mutually accepted CBDCs

between any two countries could allow them to continue trading and therefore bypass sanc-

tions. is reduces the need for the dollar infrastructure in international settlements and,

importantly, raises the threshold for returning to the dollar when the option presents itself in

the future. International nancial fragmentation encourages the development of CBDCs and

may be part of the explanation for their rapid advancement in the past few years.

2 The emergence of CBDCs

We rst clarify how CBDCs may dier from physical cash. Figure 1 describes the taxonomy

of money. e digital form of a sovereign currency, a CBDC would be legal tender and fully

guaranteed by public authorities. is contrasts with deposits in commercial banks which

are guaranteed only in part: for example, €100,000 in the euro area and $250,000 in the US.

As legal tender, CBDCs could not be refused as means of payment or for repaying debts in the

respective jurisdictions.

However, legal tender laws are not sucient to guarantee the acceptability of a new cur-

rency, as shown in the literature (Lotz and Rocheteau, 2002). In a two-sided market, accepta-

bility comes not only from take-up by consumers, but also from take-up by merchants, who

must invest in the necessary equipment. is has been shown to be an obstacle and would

have to be addressed for CBDCs.

Also, CBDCs will be convertible one-to-one into other forms of central bank money –

reserve balances or cash. A CBDC will be the closest substitute possible to physical cash,

which settles near instantly. However, while the technology may be able to ensure privacy,

CBDCs will not allow for anonymity in the same way as physical cash. Last, holding CBDCs

would mean holding a direct liability with the respective central bank, very much like holding

a banknote.

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摘要：

MariaDemertzis(maria.demertzis@bruegel.org)isaSeniorFellowatBruegelCatarinaMartins(catarinamartins@bruegel.org)isaResearchAnalystatBruegelExecutivesummaryDifferentjurisdictionshavesetoutdierentreasonsforcreatingcentralbankdigitalcurrencies(CBDCs).Somecountries,particularlythosewithalready-operation...

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